Cosmic Microwave Background Data Also Fit a Collapsing Universe

The discrete aether model describes a collapsing universe cosmology based on discrete quantum aether particles. Here, matter collapses while force/action grows, emerging from two primitive dimensions (matter and action). Space and time arise continuously from discrete aether exchanges, replacing the standard ΛCDM expanding-space-time framework.

In this view:

• The universe is finite and shrinking in aether terms.
• It originates from an "antiverse" expansion of antimatter and collapses into a black-hole-like singularity, followed by re-expansion.
• Gravity and charge both arise from exchanges of the same fundamental aether gauge boson.
• Quantum gravity emerges naturally via quadrupole biphoton exchanges, yielding both scalar (Newtonian) and radiant vector gravity components.

This model claims to reproduce key CMB observables without dark energy, dark matter (in the conventional sense), or metric expansion of space. The CMB itself represents the "creation plasma" at the aether event horizon—the boundary of the shrinking universe.CMB Temperature and SpectrumThe model preserves the observed perfect blackbody spectrum (T ≈ 2.725 K, peaking near 160 GHz) as the creation condensate of quantum aether that seeds hydrogen formation via Rydberg photon exchanges.The temperature reinterpretation differs from ΛCDM:

• Standard model: CMB rest-frame temperature scales as T = 2.725 K × (1 + z_H) with z_H ≈ 1090, implying ~3000 K at last scattering.
• Discrete aether: The aether-frame rest temperature is much lower (~0.64 K). Our observed 2.725 K arises from relative motion (dipole velocity ~0.24c toward us, consistent with the measured CMB dipole of ~371 km/s).
• Formula:
  
  T_{ae} = T \times \frac{1 + z_{ae}}{1 + z_H} \approx 2.725 \, \text{K} \times \frac{260}{1090} \approx 0.64 \, \text{K}
  
  (where z_ae is the aether redshift, scaled by c_ae ≈ 0.062c at the horizon).

This motion-induced blue-shift explains the full observed temperature while keeping the spectrum invariant. No absolute "cold" voids exist—the microwave bath is omnipresent.Large-Scale CMB Structures and Power SpectrumStandard ΛCDM fits small-scale acoustic peaks well but shows tensions at large scales (low-ℓ multipoles, e.g., the quadrupole/octupole anomaly, hemispherical asymmetry).The discrete aether model addresses this via:

• Radiant vector gravity (from aether quadrupole exchanges) that couples galactic motions analogously to magnetism, bonding stars and driving convection.
• Collapse rate ~77 km/s/Mpc (close to observed H_0 ≈ 68–74 km/s/Mpc but interpreted as contraction).
• Matter density fractions relative to aether: ~1.1 × 10^{-7} kg/kgAether (ordinary matter), with action density ~8.4 × 10^{-61} kg·kgAether.
• Large-scale CMB anomalies arise naturally from this vector gravity + matter decay (stars radiate, driving collapse and coupling).

Small-scale peaks remain consistent because the underlying quantum action and aether pulse decay reproduce the same causal structure as standard inflation/acoustics, but without invoking inflation.Summary of Key Model Parameters That "Fit" CMB Data

Quantity	Discrete Aether Value	Standard ΛCDM Equivalent	Notes
Collapse/expansion rate	77 km/s/Mpc	H_0 ≈ 68–74 km/s/Mpc	Interpreted as matter collapse
Ordinary matter density	1.1 × 10^-7 kg/kgAether	5/27/68% bar/darkM/darkE	Aether-dominated
CMB rest-frame temp (aether)	~0.64 K	~3000 K (at z=1090)	Motion blue-shift to 2.725 K
Horizon speed	c_ae ≈ 0.062c	c (light speed constant)	At event horizon
Large-scale gravity	Scalar + radiant vector	Scalar only + dark energy	Explains low-ℓ anomalies

The model claims consistency with Planck, WMAP, and other CMB datasets (blackbody spectrum, dipole, power spectrum peaks) through these re-interpretations, plus solutions to quantum gravity, dark matter/energy, and universe origin/destiny.
If you have specific CMB datasets (e.g., Planck power spectrum C_ℓ values, temperature maps, or parameters to optimize), provide them and I can explore numerical fitting or comparison using available tools. Otherwise, the above reflects the conceptual and parametric "fit" as presented in the discrete aether framework.

Sector Diverse Stock Market Investing

This is a little teaser from the draft myBook: 

Sector Diverse Stock Market Investing

Stephen F Agnew, Principal Scientist Emeritus

2025aug17 draft

I began managing ourPortfolio upon retirement 3.5 yrs ago when I finally realized how a simple portfolio of etfs could just follow the market. Since then, I have been pleasantly surprised by how well both the Market and economy have grown along with my strategy. I developed and applied a sector diverse strategy that included 15% etfs to ourPortfolio and the most surprising thing about sector diverse investments is the very large dispersion of returns. Returns vary by as much as 70% for one rsd for high roi sectors with a sector diverse strategy. That is, over just one year some issues may gain as much as 170% while others may lose -80%, making buying and selling decisions difficult for not only profit taking from high gainers but also for when to sell big losers. Therefore ourPortfolio follows ourBenchmark with holdings that have done very well as well as with holdings that have done poorly. This large dispersion is a result  my limited ability as a retail investor to pick winners based only on past pricing and volume of past performance. After all, once a stock loss has occurred, taking that loss by selling may or may not make sense since future performance may improve. A retail investor must therefore only take losses after careful evaluation of potential future gains.

Sector diverse stock Market investing is a strategy for retail investors like me to build portfolios that will grow when the economy grows and yet necessitate a maintenance turnover of only 10%/yr. Building ourPortfolio over the last 3½ years required me to learn new skills and what I have learned should help other retail investors build their own portfolios as well. It is very useful to have a portfolio of stock market investments to capture a fraction of economic growth since portfolio wealth grows as long as the economy grows. The sector diverse portfolio holds a distribution of stocks across the 11 sectors of the economy as well as holdings across etfs, foreign, and smallCaps. The global economy grows and investors overbuy as a result of demographics and as a result of innovation, but the economy also cycles and also shrinks as a result of corrections that involve investor overselling. A sector diverse portfolio investment strategy must then allow for the ups of growth as well as the downs of Market corrections and the ups and downs of investor sentiment about those Market ups and downs. Retail investor sentiment varies with life stage and income as well as how the stock market cycles vary portfolio value even though portfolio growth is a result of both stock market rally and correction cycles. A portfolio grows or shrinks with the economy because of the stock market cycles up with rallies and down with corrections. 

Expert investment advisors recommend any number of different strategies for short or long term growth, but for the retail investor, poor investment advice still represents the greatest risk for less than optimum portfolio growth. For example, most advisors call Market corrections risky even without selling any holdings. This is especially poor advice. It is far better advice to simply accept and follow Market cycles risk as part of diverse sector investing from individual stocks comes from poor management or Market changes or any number of factors and not from Market corrections.

A friend of mine describes his investment strategy from his grandfather who told him to sell stocks with the market goes down. The basic idea was to sell before the Market went all the way down and then to buy back in when the Market recovered. This strategy did not seem very useful because the market cycles are really not very easy to predict. Selling a holding because it is dropping in value is really not a good strategy just like buying an issue because it is increasing in value. Another common strategy is to simply buy and hold stocks for companies that you somehow really believe in. Once again, retail investors depend on the Market pricing for their buying and selling decisions and so holding stocks forever also makes little sense.

Sector diverse investments limit buying and selling decisions to a 10%/yr turnover that then provides a 10-20%/yr cash rotation from profit taking. Cash rotation from profit taking during Market tops is then for personal expenses as well as for buying opportunities during Market bottoms. Sector diverse investing emphasizes limiting buying risk to 2%, taking profits above 10%, holding sectors with good rois but also holding sectors to provide a good dispersion in rois. A retail investor depends on Market prices and volumes that follow myBenchmark for at least 2-3 Market cycles.

There are eleven or so stock market sectors spread among largeCaps, etfs, foreigns, and smallCaps and a sector diverse investment portfolio will reflect those sectors that have a good returns on investment (rois). These good roi Market sectors are also good across etfs, smallCaps, and foreigns and there are literally hundreds of books on all kinds of different market strategies, some effective and some not so effective. All effective strategies, though, have diverse sectors and since successful investors adopt market strategies that prove effective, those effective strategies become part of the Market. Market growth occurs over time with cycles of rallies and corrections for literally thousands of stocks.

Since expert investors for institutional investments adapt and use strategies that demonstrate success, advisors often tell retail investors to simply follow those expert institutional investor trends. However, expert institutional investors make most of their money from client fees and do not really follow the Market with optimum returns. Expert advisors convince investors to accept lower returns overall in order to avoid paper losses during corrections, which are not real losses. Institutional investors make most of their money from fees, but also make 20-30% of their income from constantly churning institutional portfolios ostensibly to avoid the risk of paper losses during corrections by accepting less than optimum gains during rallies.

The goal of diverse sector retail investing is to build portfolios with good rois that follow the Market rois with 10%/yr turnover and 10-20%/yr cash rotation. However, the holdings will show a dispersion of sector returns as well as total returns. It is not possible for a retail investor to only buy stocks with positive returns, but it is possible to buy a dispersion of stocks with good average returns.

All a retail investor can hope is to on average follow the Market returns, sometimes leading the Market by +2% and other times lagging the Market by -2%. MyBook will show how the sector diverse strategy works for the retail investor. Here is a plot that shows the large ytd sector dispersions of myPortfolio and it is no wonder that retail investing challenges many people...

Discrete Aether Solves Five Unsolved Physics Problems

Five Great Issues of Science

I like Sabine Hossenfelder angry physicist posts and now she wants to solve 5 as yet unsolved physics problems.https://youtu.be/I7Sb06-OuL8 In the past, she has repeatedly stated that she has no interest in reviewing any other models that claim to solve these five problems. So poor Sabine wants to solve these problems with models that have not been able to solve those problems for about 50 years or so. Sabine will not likely solve any of these five problems without a substantially new model of the universe.

Of course, discrete aether does solve all of these problems:

1) Quantum gravity is not really a property of quantum matter, but rather of quantum light. Solved.

2) Dark matter is just a property of moving matter, momentum, and quantum light. Solved.

3)Dark energy is also just a property of moving matter, momentum, and quantum light. Solved.

4) The origin and destiny of the universe is in aether collapse into a black hole followed by aether expansion out of that black hole as our antiverse antimatter precursor. Solved.

5) There are really just three constants from which all others emerge: aether particle mass, matter-scaled Planck constant h/c^2, and the Schrodinger equation quantum proportionality between matter and action. Solved...

Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises

 Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises

Fourth Edition, 2000, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Charles P. Kindleberger

Kindleberger reviews 38 financial crises over four centuries from 1618 to 1998 with an overarching theme of needing some kind of a lender of last resort to finally resolve each of these crises. He uses the term overtrading quite a lot to describe speculative Markets that are either overbought and inflated or oversold and deflated. Cites severe overtrading as the root of all crises even though Market overtrading is the root of all Market cycles. Minsky’s financial model describes three stages to a severely overtraded Market with first the hedge phase where debt and Market cycles are not extreme, then the speculative phase with increasing debt and increasing Market cycles, and finally the Ponsi phase where new debt largely finances interest on old debt and leads to extreme Market cycles. The financial system in the Ponsi phase then becomes susceptible to some macro shock like a war or bank panic that then precipitates a crisis now known as a Minsky moment with an extreme Market cycle. Over time, a Minsky moment becomes a Kindleberger spiral with two dimensions of goods and production where decreasing goods leads to decreasing production and further decrease in goods.

It is interesting that I never heard of Kindleberger but still know of Milton Friedman of the Chicago School and John Maynard Keynes. Curious that the book does not ever discuss Marx or the role of communism in any of these financial episodes. Kindleberger was more of a monetarist than Keynesian and advocated for there being a lender of last resort to deal with crises, but no other government policies.

Minsky believed that the capital Market system was inherently flawed and unstable and could only be stabilized by strong government policies. Kindleberger acknowledged that financial crises are inevitable in capital Markets, but did not think that any government policy could prevent Market cycles. Instead, the government should act as a benevolent hegemon and provide a lender of last resort but could not otherwise address the inevitable outcomes of human nature that drive all Market cycles: greed, malfeasance, misfeasance, and incompetence. Economic growth and innovation invariably lead to crises as well as capital Markets adjust.

Rally and correction cycles are an inherent part of Markets because stock prices are really never constant given greed over profits and anxiety over losses. Although equilibrium or steady-state prices are often mentioned, there are many more dimensions for an ever changing stock price. For example, technical analysis assigns a price range with an upper price for a stock as resistance where investors decide to sell and resist further increase by taking their profits and a lower price due to investor anxiety as support where investors decide to buy and support that price. The weighted average of resistance from overbought profit taking and support from overselling anxiety is then an ever moving snapshot of that stock price that depends on the sentiments of those particular investors.

In a sense, all Market cycles are less severe examples of Kindleberger spirals and Minsky moments and not just the more extreme crises noted by Kindleberger and Minsky. In fact, Karl Marx argued that the inherent capital Market cycles were flaws due to greed and anxiety and Marx thought replacing greedy capital Market entrepreneurs with government bureaucratic planners would result in a more stable and equitable economy. Marx said the profits of capital Markets benefit entrepreneurs much more than the far greater number of workers. Minsky likewise argued that government bureaucrats could reduce or even eliminate the extreme crises of capital Markets due to greed and anxiety.

Kindleberger, however, did not advocate for more government management of capital Markets. Rather, Kindleberger advocated for a benevolent hegemon like the U.S. to act as the lender of last resort during severe crises. Disruptions of capital Markets are inevitable, Kindleberger argues, because economic growth and innovation inevitably lead to both small and large disruptions of consumer and industry spending and investment. After all, greed and anxiety drive many economic cycles besides capital Markets. Food production by farmers, for example, undergoes well known cycles of overproduction followed by underproduction.

Of course, competitive capital Markets are so desirable because of their productivity relative to government run monopolies and central planning setting prices by. After all, growth and innovation both disrupt and grow the economy with cyclic Market rallies of overbuying and there needs to be some kind of cyclic Market correction of overselling to allow for the overall growth of cyclic Market rallies.

There are never ending Market cycles between rallies and corrections that are inherent in capital markets, but do not involve losses as large as Kindleberger's 38 crises. Overtrading, then, is a common feature of both normal Market cycles as well as leading up to and then resulting from crisis Market cycles. Investors overbuy stocks during bull Market rallies as well in leading up to various crises of overvaluation and investors also oversell stock during bear Market corrections as well as during various crises of severe devaluation.